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In 1999, fifty-seven of sixty-eight Major League Baseball umpires resigned 
in protest of the policies the Commissioner of Baseball sought to implement.1  
Although the resigning umpires later attempted to rescind their letters of resig-
nation, the League refused to reinstate twenty-two of the umpires.2  The twenty-
two umpires filed grievances that were submitted to arbitration for resolution.3  
The arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of nine of the twenty-two umpires.4 
In 1998, the National Basketball Association (NBA) locked out its players 
during the negotiations of a new collective bargaining agreement.5  The National 
Basketball Players Association filed a grievance claiming that the NBA violated 
the contracts of more than 200 players whose contracts were fully guaranteed 
for the 1998–1999 season.6  The arbitrator ruled that the NBA was not obligated 
to make salary payments during a lawful lockout.7 
An arbitrator ruled in 2014 that the New Orleans Saints’ Jimmy Graham 
was a tight end and not a wide receiver.8  Graham filed a grievance alleging that 
he deserved to be designated as a wide receiver under the franchise tag because 
he spent more time out wide and in the slot than at the line of scrimmage.9 
Professional sports leagues are not the only sports organizations using arbi-
tration to resolve disputes.  The Bylaws of the United States Olympic Commit-
tee provides for arbitration of two general types of disputes: (1) eligibility of an 
                                                          
1 See Major League Umpires Ass’n v. The Am. League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 278 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 National Basketball Players Association Grievance Denied, Player’s Do Not Need to Be Paid 
During a Lawful Lockout, YOU MAKE THE CALL (Nat’l Sports Law Inst., Milwaukee, Wis.), Spring 




8 Chris Wesseling, Jimmy Graham Deemed Tight End in System Arbitration, NFL, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000363018/article/jimmy-graham-deemed-tight-end-in-sys-
tem-arbitration (last updated July 4, 2014). 
9 Id. 
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athlete to compete10 and (2) the right of an organization to be declared the Na-
tional Governing Body for a particular sport.11  The athlete doping decisions 
involving the International Olympic Committee are resolved through arbitra-
tion.12  
In the last year, the arbitration proceedings (and ancillary litigation) of the 
suspension appeal of New York Yankees star Alex Rodriguez (commonly 
known as “A-Rod”) seemed to dominate the sports news.  Major League Base-
ball suspended A-Rod for 211 games.13  A-Rod appealed the suspension to ar-
bitration, and the arbitrator reduced the suspension to 162 games.14 
These examples demonstrate that arbitration plays an important role in re-
solving disputes in professional and amateur sports.  (The Ryan Braun arbitral 
“acquittal” and later admission of drug use is not even included.)15  While it is 
frequently said that an arbitration award is “final and binding,”16 this Article 
examines what happens after the arbitrator renders an award.17  It will examine 
the post-award procedures set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).18 
                                                          
10 U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., BYLAWS OF THE U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. § 9.7 (2014), available at 
http://www.teamusa.org/~/media/TeamUSA/Documents/Legal/Governance/2013%20Q4By-
laws%20Revisions%20120613.pdf. 
11 Id. at § 10.21. 
12 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SPORTS ARBITRATION INCLUDING OLYMPIC ATHLETE DISPUTES 
4 (2006), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004199. 
13 See Joseph Ax, Yankees' Rodriguez Drops Lawsuits Against MLB, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/07/us-baseball-yankees-rodriguez-
idUSBREA161WE20140207. 
14 A-Rod’s complaint challenging the award and containing the entire award can be accessed online.  
Complaint, Rodriguez v. Major League Baseball, Office of the Comm’r of Baseball & Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, No. 14-00244 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2013) available at http://online.wsj.com/pub-
lic/resources/documents/ARODMLB01132014.pdf.  A-Rod later dropped the suit.  See Ax, supra note 
13. 
15 See, e.g., Jeremy R. Abrams, Comment, Making the Right Call: Why Fairness Requires Inde-
pendent Appeals in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 469, 479–80 (2013). 
Wolfgang S. Weber, Comment, Preserving Baseball's Integrity Through Proper Drug Testing: Time 
for the Major League Baseball Players Association to Let Go of Its Collective Bargaining Reins, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 267, 274, 283 (2014). 
16 See JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 6:1 (3d ed. 2005). 
17 Salary arbitration in Major League Baseball is outside the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., Bibek 
Das, Salary Arbitration and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball Players, 1 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56–58 (2002); Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball's 
Monetary Structure—Salary Arbitration in Its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Jeff Monait, Baseball Arbitration: An ADR Success, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 105, 118–22 (2013); 
Edward Silverman, Dick Woodson's Revenge: The Evolution of Salary Arbitration in Major League 
Baseball, 2013 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 31—36 (2013). 
18 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1–15, 43 Stat. 883–86 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 
1–16 (2013)). 
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Alternative dispute resolution describes the techniques or processes used in 
resolving disputes short of trial in the courts.19  It complements the judicial sys-
tem by making methods available for the resolution of disputes that may be 
more economical or efficient than the courts. 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures can be adjudicatory or non-adju-
dicatory.  Arbitration is an adjudicatory procedure closely resembling tradi-
tional litigation.  Arbitration is the method of dispute resolution voluntarily cho-
sen by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial person or persons 
of their own mutual selection, whose decision (referred to as an “award”), based 
on the merits of the case, is agreed to in advance to be accepted as final and 
binding.20  
Arbitration procedures are less formal than the procedures in a trial before 
a court.  Unless the parties agree to the contrary, “the arbitrator is not bound to 
follow the law, but instead may base the decision on business custom and prac-
tice technical insight, or broad principles of equity and justice.”21  
Because the purpose of arbitration is the settlement of a controversy and 
avoidance of litigation, the purpose would be defeated if the losing party in ar-
bitration had ready access to the court as though no arbitration award existed.22  
Once confirmed by a court, an arbitrator’s award is enforceable in the same 
                                                          
19 See GRENIG, supra note 16, at § 1:1. 
20 See, e.g., Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No. 0510135, 
707 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 155 (2013) (meaning of “arbitration” under 
the Federal Arbitration Act is governed by federal common law—not state law); Advanced Bodycare 
Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that arbitration 
within scope of the Federal Arbitration Act must produce some type of award that is meaningfully 
confirmed, modified, or vacated by court upon proper notice); Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co., LLC v. 
Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 689 (10th Cir. 2004) (defining classic arbitration as being charac-
terized by empowering a third party to render a decision to settle the dispute); AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (determining that the test for arbitration is whether par-
ties have agreed to submit a dispute to a third party for a decision, regardless of whether decision is 
binding). 
21 GRENIG, supra note 16, at § 2:36. 
22 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. v. Organon Teknika Corp., LLC, 614 F.3d 372, 375 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (holding an arbitrator’s award regarding patent royalty was final where it had resolved the 
parties’ dispute, it had been accompanied by cover letter calling it the final decision, and the parties had 
paid their final bills). 
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manner as a court judgment.23  
B. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
1. Generally 
Although willing to enforce arbitration awards, United States courts, prior 
to enactment of the FAA,24 believed “that arbitration was an inappropriate 
method to resolve disputes because it ‘ousted’ the courts of their jurisdiction.”25  
In 1874, the United States Supreme Court determined that “agreements in ad-
vance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and 
void.”26 
Seeking to overcome the judicial hostility to arbitration, the United States 
Arbitration Act (now more commonly referred to as the FAA) was introduced 
in Congress on December 20, 1922.  The goal of the FAA was to overcome the 
existing unwillingness to enforce arbitration clauses by placing them on an 
equal footing with other contracts.27  When the bill appeared before the Senate 
in December 1924, Senator Walsh described the bill as providing “for the abo-
lition of the rule that agreements for arbitration will not be specifically en-
forced.”28  The bill was passed and signed into law on February 12, 1925.29  
2. Application 
The FAA30 made arbitration clauses “as enforceable as any other contract 
provision and subject to the same defenses as applied to other contracts.”31  
Nearly sixty years later, the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA was 
substantive law preempting state arbitration laws, regardless of whether the 
                                                          
23 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13.  
24 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2013)). 
25 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory 
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 464 (1994); see 
also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 21–22 (1992). 
26 Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445, 451 (1874). 
27 Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 532 (2014) 
(citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002) (“The FAA directs courts to place arbi-
tration agreements on equal footing with other contracts . . . .”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n. 12 (1967) (“[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”)). 
28 S. 1005, 66th Cong. Rec. § 984 (1924).  
29 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15. 
30 Id. 
31 Frankel, supra note 27, at 532 (citations omitted). 
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claim was brought in state or federal court.32  
The courts initially declined to apply the FAA to disputes between employ-
ers and employees.  In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc.,33 the 
Supreme Court held that the FAA did not cover employment contracts where 
performance involved purely intrastate commercial activity. 
The United States Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.34 was the impetus for an increase in employment ar-
bitration.35  Gilmer signaled “a changed attitude on the part of the new Supreme 
Court majority as to the propriety of permitting statutory claims of employees 
to be definitively resolved in arbitration.”36  The Court expressly declined to 
address the scope of the exemption of “contracts of employment” under section 
1 of the FAA because the issue had not been argued below and the contract at 
issue was not an employment contract.37 
The Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to address the effect 
of the FAA’s employment exemption in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.38  
The Supreme Court held that the FAA applied to all contracts of employment, 
except those in the interstate transportation industries.  Using the canon of con-
struction ejusdem generis,39 the Court held that the term “other class of workers” 
                                                          
32 Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); see also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 346–
47 (2008) (holding that the FAA favored arbitration in both federal and state courts, foreclosing state 
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements and replacing it with statu-
tory administrative procedure).  See generally Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., et al. v. Clayton Brown 
et al., 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (preventing West Virginia from declining to enforce predis-
pute arbitration agreements applicable to personal injury or wrongful death claims against nursing 
homes); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (explaining that although applicable 
state law contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate 
arbitration agreements without contravening the FAA, a court may not invalidate arbitration agreements 
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions). 
33 350 U.S. 198, 200–02 (1956). 
34 See generally 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
35 “The percentage of private employers using employment arbitration grew from 3.6% in 1991 to 
19% in 1997. . . .  By 1998, 62% of large corporations had used employment arbitration on at least one 
occasion from 1993 to 1996.”  Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Em-
ployment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 777, 779–80 (2003) (citations omitted). 
36 See Stephen L. Hayford, The Changing Character of Labor Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 69, 79 (1993). 
37 Id. at 81. 
38 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).  See generally Claire Kennedy-Wilkins, Note, Playing Ostrich with 
the FAA’s History: The Scope of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Contracts, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 
1593, 1593-–94 (2003); Kristin McCandless, Comment, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: The Debate 
Over Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context Rages on, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 225 
(2002) (citations omitted). 
39 “Where general words follow specific words [in a statutory enumeration,] the general words are 
construed to [embrace] only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated” by the preceding 
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should be controlled and defined by the terms “seamen” and “railroads” that 
preceded the phrase in the exclusion provision.40  
Courts continued to adhere to the view that the FAA did not apply to labor 
arbitration cases—cases in which labor unions are parties—brought under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,41 which authorizes suits in 
federal court for violation of collective bargaining agreements.42  These courts 
adhered to the traditional view that suits arising under section 301 and concern-
ing collective bargaining agreements were outside the scope of the FAA.43  
Disagreeing with these courts, in 2009, the Supreme Court in 14 Penn Plaza 
LLC v. Pyett resolved a labor arbitration case by applying the FAA without re-
ferring to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.44  The Court 
held that unions could agree to arbitrate statutory claims of individual workers 
under the FAA.  
C. Arbitrator’s Role After the Award 
1. Generally 
The arbitrator’s role in the arbitration process generally ends when the final 
award is issued.45  In legal terms, the arbitrator is said to be functus officio.46  
                                                          
specific words.  JAY E. GRENIG, Contract Interpretation and Respect for Prior Proceedings, in LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 9.02[3][e] (2d ed. 1997). 
40 Hayford, supra note 36, at 234. 
41 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012). 
42 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 2121, AFL-CIO v. Goodrich Corp., 
410 F.3d 204, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery 
Workers Union, Local 812, 242 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001). 
43 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 
1097 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that nothing in Circuit City undermines the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills that “§ 301 provides an independent basis for federal jurisdiction to 
enforce labor arbitration [.]”); Coca-Cola, 242 F.3d at 53 (“We hold that in cases brought under Section 
301, . . . the FAA does not apply.”); Int’l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 331 F.3d 
491, 494 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the “district court appropriately relied only on [Section 301, as 
opposed to the FAA] when it confirmed the arbitration award because this case involves arbitration 
under a [collective bargaining agreement].”).  But see Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Local 232, Int’l Union, 
Allied Indus. Workers of Am. (AFL-CIO), 36 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1994) (“As it happens, our circuit 
is among the minority that has limited § 1 [of the FAA] to the transportation industries and therefore 
applies the Arbitration Act to most collective bargaining agreements.”).  
44 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009). 
45 See, e.g., EFC Dev. Corp. v. F.F. Baugh Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 540 P.2d 185, 189 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1975); see also Bosworth v. Whitmore, 135 Cal. App. 4th 536, 551–52 (2006) (holding that the 
arbitrator's failure to meet a court-ordered date for an award did not constitute a “failure to act” under 
the California statute allowing for the removal of an arbitrator). 
46 Functus officio is Latin for “office performed.”  This means that once an arbitrator has issued the 
arbitrator’s final award, the arbitrator may not revise it.  Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild v. Wash. Post 
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The authority of arbitrators is terminated by the completion and delivery of an 
award; prior to delivery of an award, by their inability to make an award; or by 
a revocation of the submission.47  A valid revocation of the submission also 
terminates the authority of the arbitrator appointed under the submission. 
Under the functus officio doctrine, it is improper for an arbitrator to recon-
sider or modify an award without the consent of both parties.  Upon the receipt 
of a request for reconsideration or modification from one party, the arbitrator 
will probably respond that he or she is powerless to reconsider the award since 
the arbitrator’s authority ended when the award was issued. 
2. Vitality of Functus Officio 
The current vitality of the doctrine of functus officio has been described as 
being “riddled with exceptions.”48  The First Circuit has concluded that a labor 
arbitrator may clarify, interpret, or amplify the arbitrator's award, functus officio 
notwithstanding.49  Courts have recognized exceptions to the doctrine of functus 
officio:50 
                                                          
Co. 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See, e.g., Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that the American Arbitration Association's commercial arbitration rule providing that 
“the arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine [sic] merits of any claim already decided, ‘essentially 
codifies the common law doctrine of functus officio’”); Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 
985, 991 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Glass Molders v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 846–47 (7th 
Cir.1995)) (stating functus officio conceives of arbitrators as “ad hoc judges—judges for a case; and 
when the case is over they cease to be judges and go back to being law professors or businessmen or 
whatever else they are in private life.”).  
47 See, e.g., McKeeby v. Arthur, 81 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1951). 
48 Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 182B v. 
Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 846–47 (7th Cir. 1995).  Cf. Arbitrators may not, except for reasons 
within the applicable arbitration statute or rules, modify or correct an arbitration award.  With respect 
to an arbitrator’s power to correct an award, the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association provide as follows: 
 
Within 20 days after the transmittal of an award, any party, upon notice to the 
other parties, may request the arbitrator, through the AAA, to correct any clerical, 
typographical, or computational errors in the award.  The arbitrator is not empow-
ered to redetermine [sic] the merits of any claim already decided.  The other par-
ties shall be given 10 days to respond to the request.  The arbitrator shall dispose 
of the request within 20 days after transmittal by the AAA to the arbitrator of the 
request and any response thereto. 
 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N LABOR ARBITRATION R. 40 (2013); accord AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION R. 40 (2009).   
49 Local 2322, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Verizon New England, Inc., 464 F.3d 93, 97–98 (1st 
Cir. 2006). 
50 Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d at 991–92; Colonial Penn. Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co. v. Nat’l Risk 
Underwriters, Inc., 943 F.2d 327, 332 (3d Cir. 1991); Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council AFL-CIO 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 353 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.1965). See also Office & Prof’l Emps. Int'l Union, Local 
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• An arbitrator can correct a mistake, such as a clerical mis-
take or obvious error of arithmetic computation, which is 
apparent on the face of the award.51 
• Where the award does not adjudicate an issue that has been 
submitted, then as to such issue the arbitrator has not ex-
hausted his or her function and it remains open to the arbi-
trator for subsequent determination.52 
• Where the award, although seemingly complete, leaves 
doubt whether the submission has been fully executed, con-
tains an ambiguity.53 
 
3. Retention of Jurisdiction 
If the arbitrator has expressly retained jurisdiction over the award in order 
to resolve disputes with respect to computing the remedy, courts will generally 
recognize the continuing authority of the arbitrator.  For example, where an ar-
bitrator reinstates a discharged employee, directs that the employee to be paid 
all lost wages, and the parties cannot agree on the amount of back pay due to 
the employee, the arbitrator would have authority to determine the amount of 
back pay.54 
Such an arrangement is a sound one since it allows the arbitration hearing 
to be devoted to the merits of the discharge dispute and delays the consideration 
of the back pay issue until a determination is made concerning the discharge.  
Also, this arrangement gives the parties the opportunity to resolve disputes 
                                                          
No. 471 v. Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d 326, 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1999) (doctrine of functus officio 
does not bar a court from remanding a case to the arbitrator for clarification of an award). 
51 See, e.g., T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 342 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“[e]ven after becoming functus officio, an arbitrator retains limited authority to correct a mistake which 
is apparent on the face of the award; this inherent authority applies narrowly to clerical mistakes or 
obvious errors in arithmetic computation”). 
52 See New United Motor Mfg., Inc. v. United Auto Workers Local 2244, 617 F. Supp. 2d 948, 949, 
962–63 (N.D. Calif. 2008) (Both parties expressed that they wanted to keep the award open and have 
the arbitrator calculate “time-for-time clock compensation” at a later date.  The arbitrator declined ju-
risdiction and the award was complete without computing compensation because the plaintiff declined 
to use a substitute arbitrator.  Although the court did not condone the arbitrator’s decision to decline 
jurisdiction, it was well within his power to do so.); accord CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES § 6.E.1 (2007), available at 
naarb.org/code.html (“[a]n arbitrator may retain remedial jurisdiction in the award to resolve any ques-
tions that may arise over application or interpretation of a remedy”). 
53 See, e.g., Courier-Citizen Co. v. Bos. Electrotypers Union No. 11702 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir.1983) 
(arbitrator allowed to explain remedy sketched out in award). 
54 See Steel v. Vacumet Corp., No: 2:09-CV-165, 2011 WL 345810, *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 1, 2011) 
(holding it is arbitrator’s responsibility to calculate back pay). 
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themselves. 
D. Confirmation of an Award 
1. Generally 
The function of an arbitration award is to resolve a dispute.  The arbitrator, 
however, has no power or authority to enforce the award.  It serves no purpose 
to complain to an arbitrator if the other party refuses to comply with the award.  
Until an arbitration award is confirmed or vacated, it has only the effect of a 
written contract between the parties.  
A party may refuse to comply with the arbitration award.  If this happens or 
is likely to happen, the other party may petition a court to have the award con-
firmed.55  The party refusing to comply with the award has the burden of justi-
fying its action and may raise issues similar to those that might be raised in a 
suit to vacate an arbitration award, provided the time for requesting the court to 
vacate an award has not expired.56  
2. Procedure 
The procedure for obtaining an enforceable judgment is to petition a court 
to confirm the award.57  A proceeding for confirmation of an arbitration award 
is not a trial of the issues or a separate proceeding; the court has no authority to 
hear the case de novo or on the merits.58  A court must confirm an “arbitration 
award unless there are significant reasons to the contrary.”59 
                                                          
55 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2013). 
56 See id. § 12. See also Schreiber v. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 879 N.E.2d 733, 738 (N.Y. 2007) (holding 
that the burden of proof stays with the party refusing to comply regardless of party’s occupation). 
57 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9; Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft v. Ecoplas, Inc., 391 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 
2004) (holding that parties are not required to consent to confirmation before an arbitration award could 
be confirmed); Toal v. Tardif, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1208, 1208–09 (2009) (holding that under California 
law, the party seeking to enforce arbitration award must provide by preponderance of the evidence that 
valid arbitration contract existed). 
58 See, e.g., Lesser Towers, Inc. v. Roscoe-Ajax Const. Co., 258 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (S.D. Cal. 
1966).  Cf. Local 2322, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Verizon New England, Inc., 464 F.3d 93, 97 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (holding that a party who fails to initiate action to vacate or modify arbitration within the 
applicable time limit is barred from asserting those claims as defenses to a later action to confirm). 
59 See, e.g., Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
there is a presumption that arbitration awards will be confirmed, and “federal courts should defer to 
arbitrators’ decisions whenever possible”); Oaktree Capital Mgt., L.P. v. Bernard, 182 Cal. App. 4th 
60, 66 (2010) (holding that under California law, when a party petitions the court to confirm an arbi-
tration award, the opposing party may seek vacation of the award by way of response only if he serves 
and files his response within ten days after the service of the petition.  Unless the response is duly 
served and filed, the allegations of the petition are deemed to be admitted by the opposing party.); 
Compania Chilena De Navegacion Interoceanica, S.A. v. Norton, Lilly & Co., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1512, 
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There must be an independent basis of federal jurisdiction before a federal 
district court can entertain a motion to confirm under the FAA.60  The federal 
nature of the claims submitted to arbitration is not a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 since the rights asserted in the petition for 
confirmation are “based on the contract to arbitrate rather than on the underlying 
substantive claims.”61 
The FAA provides that at any time within one year after an arbitration award 
is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court for an order confirm-
ing the award.62  Notice of the application must be served upon the adverse 
party.63  The FAA further provides that,  
 
[I]f the parties have agreed in the arbitration agreement that a 
judgment of the court must be entered upon the award made 
pursuant to the arbitration at any time within one year after the 
award is made, any time within one year after the award is 
made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court for an 
order confirming the award.64   
 
This period has been held to be permissive rather than mandatory, allowing 
judicial confirmation of an award after the one-year period.65 
Frequently, the losing party files an application to vacate and the prevailing 
party files a cross-application to confirm.  In National Basketball Ass’n v. Na-
tional Basketball Players Ass’n, the NBA Players Association moved to vacate 
an arbitrator’s award upholding the suspension of four players who brawled 
with fans at a game in 2004.66  The court found that the arbitrator was not pre-
cluded from issuing an award in the matter.67 
In Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, Inc., the Seventh Circuit confirmed an 
                                                          
1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
60 See, e.g., City of Detroit Pension Fund v. Prudential Secs. Inc., 91 F.3d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1996). 
61 See, e.g., id. 
62 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. See, e.g., Idea Nuova, Inc. v. GM Licensing Grp., Inc., 617 F.3d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted) (holding that a “contract provision providing for arbitration to be conducted” under 
American Arbitration Association rules is equivalent to consenting to judicial confirmation of arbitra-
tion award pursuant to rules); Matthew R. Kissling, Note, “A Sure and Expedited Resolution of Dis-
putes”: The Federal Arbitration Act and the One-Year Requirement for Summary Confirmation of Ar-
bitration Awards, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 890 (2010) (citations omitted). 
65 Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 1148, 1154 (4th Cir. 1993). 
66 No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD), 2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005). 
67 Id. 
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award that rejected an opposing petition to vacate an arbitrator’s award and de-
termined which wrestler would go to the Olympics.68  The court explained that 
the arbitration proceeding initiated by an amateur wrestler, in which the wrestler 
obtained an award ordering a rematch between the wrestler and a second wres-
tler, who had won the original match for nomination to United States Olympic 
Committee, was not flawed by the fact that wrestler who had won the original 
match was not a party because the governing statute provided for arbitration 
between the aggrieved athlete and the national governing body, not arbitration 
among athletes.69 
3. Court Order 
If the court finds merit in the petition to enforce the arbitration award, the 
court will order the resisting party to comply with the award.70  When an award 
is confirmed, the judgment entered has the same force as any other civil judg-
ment and may be enforced accordingly.71  The prevailing party is entitled to 
costs, as in other civil proceedings.72  The judgment entered on the award is 
appealable.73  
E. Clarification of an Award 
1. Generally 
After an award is rendered, a party may have a question regarding its mean-
ing or interpretation.  If a party believes interpretation or clarification of the 
award is needed, the party should contact the other party and request that both 
join in a written request for the interpretation or clarification of the award.  The 
joint request constitutes a new grant of authority to the arbitrator.74  By both 
                                                          
68 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000). 
69 Id. 
70 See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2013) (the court must grant an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or 
corrected). 
71 Id.; see Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs., Ltd. v. Webb, 473 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2007) (determining 
that the district court's order confirming an arbitration award encompassed a provision of the award 
pertaining to future payments, not just payments already due, even though order did not express address 
part of award relating to contract renewals, where order made no statement that court was only partly 
confirming arbitration award). 
72 Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs., Ltd., 473 F.3d at 501. 
73 9 U.S.C. § 16. 
74 See Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 219 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that if both parties request 
a clarification, the arbitrator has the power to clarify and interpret, but not modify the award); Douglas 
Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted) (holding that where the 
original arbitration decision was ambiguous, it was proper for employer and union to obtain from arbi-
trator a clarification of his reasoning). 
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parties joining in the request, the request can be framed and worded in a fair and 
objective manner.  An arbitrator must afford both parties and opportunity to be 
heard. 
2.  Procedure 
If the other party will not join in a request that the award be clarified, a 
petition may be filed in court asking that the arbitrator be directed to clarify the 
award.75  A court may order clarification if it concludes the award is unclear and 
the petitioning party has been unable to obtain the consent of the other party for 
a request for clarification.76 
F. Correction or Modification of an Award 
1. Generally 
There is no authority under the FAA for an arbitrator to correct an award 
after it has been served on the parties.  Under the FAA, only a court may correct 
an award.77  The FAA provides that a court may make an order modifying or 
correcting an arbitration award upon the application of any party to the arbitra-
tion.78  
2.  Grounds for Modification 
Any of the following is grounds for modification under the FAA:  
 
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of fig-
ures or an evident material mistake in the description of any 
person, thing, or property referred to in the award. 
 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not sub-
mitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of 
                                                          
75 See 9 U.S.C. § 11; Tripi v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In 
light of the highly deferential standard due an arbitral award, however, I will remand to the Panel with 
instructions that it explain its allocation of damages.  After the Panel provides its explanation, either 
party may return to this Court to confirm, modify, or vacate the Award.”); Sociedad Armadora Aristo-
menis Panama, S.A. v. Tri-Coast S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp. 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
76 Cf. Tripi, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (“In light of the highly deferential standard due an arbitral award, 
however, I will remand to the Panel with instructions that it explain its allocation of damages.  After 
the Panel provides its explanation, either party may return to this Court to confirm, modify, or vacate 
the Award.”). 
77 See 9 U.S.C. § 11. 
78 Id. 
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the decision upon the matter submitted. 
 
(c) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affect-
ing the merits of the controversy.79 
 
a.  Miscalculation   
The provision in the FAA that arbitration awards may be modified or cor-
rected for “evident miscalculation of figures” applies only to mathematical er-
rors committed by the arbitrators that “would be patently clear to the reviewing 
court.”80  This provision is not intended to permit the litigants to persuade the 
courts “to review the evidence and then reach a different result.”81  A mere error 
committed by the arbitrators as to questions of fact or law is not sufficient to 
establish the type of excess of power necessary to set aside an award.82 
In Ryba v. Benyon Sports Surfaces, Inc., the plaintiff sold athletic services 
and related products on behalf of the defendant.83  When the plaintiff terminated 
their contract with the defendant in 2006, the plaintiff claimed the defendant 
owed him over $100,000.84  The parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion.85  The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $90,000 plus attorney’s fees.86 
The defendant sought to have a New Jersey court vacate the award because 
of calculation errors.87  The court found no merit in the defendant’s claims.88  
Because the parties had never agreed to attorney’s fees, the court deleted the 
attorney’s fee portion of the award.89 
b. Defects in Form   
An award may be modified or corrected under the FAA “where the award 
                                                          
79 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)–(c). 
80 Carolina Va. Fashion Exhibitors v. Gunter, 255 S.E.2d 414, 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). See 9 
U.S.C. § 11(a). 
81 Carolina Va. Fashion Exhibitors, Inc., 255 S.E.2d at 419. 
82 Scherrer Constr. Co. v. Burlington Mem’l Hosp., 221 N.W.2d 855, 860 (Wis. 1974).  See, e.g., 
N. Boulevard Plaza v. N. Boulevard Assocs., 526 S.E.2d 2013, 2015 (N.C. App. 2000) (applying North 
Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act and holding that the arbitrator lacked authority to modify award 
based on incorrect formula, rather than on miscalculation of figures). 
83 No. L-6468-06, 2010 WL 4811900 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Nov. 29, 2010). 
84 Id. at *1.  
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
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is imperfect in form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.”90  For example, 
it was held that modifying an arbitrator's award to, in effect, substitute the word 
“DECLARES” for the word “FINDS” in the first sentence of the arbitration 
award would not affect the merits of the controversy, but would merely make 
clear that the findings stated the declaratory relief; whereas, the “AWARD” sec-
tion stated the monetary relief.91 
3. Procedure 
“Notice of a motion to modify or correct [an award] must be served upon 
the adverse party within three months after the award is filed or delivered.”92  
An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative 
with an application to vacate the award. 
Only a party aggrieved by an arbitrator's award may bring an action to mod-
ify or correct the award.93  One who is not a party to the arbitration has no stand-
ing to challenge the validity of an award.94  
There is a split of authority as to whether an application to correct an award 
may properly be filed after the limitations period has run where the application 
alleges the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction.  The majority rule is that failure to file 
a timely application to correct an arbitration award raises an absolute bar.95  The 
minority view is that a collateral attack on an award issued without jurisdiction 
is always permissible.96 
If an application to confirm an arbitration award is filed within the time 
period for vacating, correcting, or modifying the award, any response seeking 
to vacate, correct, or modify the award must be filed within the time period for 
responses generally.97  If the application to confirm is filed after the time period 
                                                          
90 9 U.S.C. § 11(c) (2013). 
91 Fischer v. CGA Computer Assocs., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1038, 1041–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
92 9 U.S.C. § 12. 
93 See, e.g., E.M. Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Local 169, Teamsters, 812 F.2d 91, 97 (3d Cir. 1987). 
94 See Eisen v. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 352 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Minn. 1984). 
95 See, e.g., Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 
1339 (9th Cir. 1986); Jaffe v. Nocera, 493 A.2d 1003, 1012 (D.C. App. 1985); Local 589, Amalgamated 
Transit Union v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 491 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (Mass. 1986); Beriker v. Permagrain 
Prods., Inc., 500 A.2d 178, 179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Bingham Cnty. Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 
665 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Idaho 1983). 
96 See, e.g., Austin v. Stovall, 475 So.2d 1014, 1014–15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
97 See, e.g., Johnson v. Baumgardt, 276 N.E.2d 515, 519-–20 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a 
party to arbitration “may properly challenge the arbitration award through a defense to a complaint to 
confirm” the award as long as challenge is raised within statutory ninety–day limitation). 
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for vacating, correcting, or modifying the award, the losing party cannot chal-
lenge the award.98 
An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alterna-
tive with an application to vacate the award.  An application to vacate or correct 
an arbitration award must be filed in a court having jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and the parties.  It must be served on all parties in the same manner as a 
notice of motion.99 
The application must set forth the following: 
 
 The substance of the agreement to arbitrate (a copy of the 
agreement should be attached and incorporated by refer-
ence, unless the petitioner denies the existence of the agree-
ment); 
 The names of the arbitrator or arbitrators; 
 A copy of the award and the arbitrator’s written opinion, if 
any; 
 The grounds for relief; and 
 The date the award was served on the moving party.100 
 
Where the application alleges facts not shown on the face of the documents, 
competent proof (normally in the form of declarations or affidavits) is required 
to set forth facts establishing the grounds relied upon.  An arbitrator’s declara-
tions should be inadmissible to explain the reasons for the award or the merits 
of the controversy. 
                                                          
98 See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. of Charles Cnty. v. Ed. Ass'n of Charles Cnty., 408 A.2d 89, 93 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1979) (holding that where a school board took no action to vacate an arbitration award 
within time limit provided by Uniform Arbitration Act, the arbitration award requiring the school board 
to effect transfer of teacher was properly confirmed); Cf. Richardson v. Harris, 818 P.2d 1209, 1210–11 
(Nev. 1991) (holding that the trial court should have confirmed arbitration upon construction company's 
motion because the landowner's motion for modification or correction of award was untimely); Trs. of 
Bos. & Maine Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 294 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Mass. 1973) (holding that 
neither application to arbitrator for modification or correction of award, nor modification or correction 
by arbitrator extends the period within which party may apply to vacate or modify original award).  But 
see H.E. Sargent, Inc. v. Town of Millinocket, 478 A.2d 683, 686 (Me. 1984) (holding that where the 
application to confirm arbitration award is pending, the court has the authority to submit an award to 
the arbitrators for clarification, notwithstanding that none of parties to the award applied for modifica-
tion or correction of award within the ninety–day time limit); Borough of Dunmore v. Dunmore Police 
Dep’t, 526 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (holding that the trial court deciding the petition 
to enforce and confirm the arbitration award had authority to resubmit damages portion of award to 
arbitrator for clarification even though no petition for modification or correction was filed). 
99 See 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2013). 
100 See id. at § 13. 
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G. Vacation of an Award 
1. Generally 
A party who is dissatisfied with an arbitration award may seek to have a 
court “vacate” or set aside the award.101  Under the FAA, a court may order 
vacation of an arbitration award “upon the application of any party to the arbi-
tration.”102  The court must find that a specified ground for vacating the award 
exists.103  
When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes, they opt out of the court sys-
tem.104  When one of the parties challenges the resulting arbitration award, the 
party does not do so “on the ground the arbitrator made a mistake, but that [the 
arbitrator] violated the arbitration agreement by corruption; evident partiality; 
[or] exceeding [his or her] powers, conduct to which the parties did not consent 
when they included an arbitration clause in their contract.”105  
In reviewing an arbitration award, a court is precluded from considering the 
factual or legal issues that were, by voluntary agreement, made the subject of 
the arbitration.106  An arbitrator's decision will be upheld, unless it is completely 
irrational or constitutes a manifest disregard of the law.  
“Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of enforcing the award.”107   
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “‘as long as an honest arbitrator is even 
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his 
[or her] authority,’ the fact that ‘a court is convinced [the arbitrator] committed 
                                                          
101 See id. at § 10. 
102 Id. at §10(a). 
103 See id. (listing specified grounds for vacation). 
104 See GRENIG, supra note 16, at § 24:10. 
105 See Edstrom Industs., Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (cita-
tions omitted). 
106 See Wackenhut Corp. v. Amalgamated Local 515, 126 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the reviewing court must affirm an award it views as incorrect, so long as the decision is plausibly 
grounded in the parties' agreement); Thompson v. Tega–Rand Int'l, 740 F.2d 762,763 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that a court will not review the merits of a dispute where the parties have agreed to arbitration); 
Smith v. PSI Servs. II Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-6749, 2001 WL 41122, *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2001) (holding 
that a court cannot vacate an arbitrator's decision because the arbitrator misapplied the law); City of 
Richmond v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1021, 189 Cal. App. 4th 663, 663, 671, 673 (2010) (holding 
that the arbitrator did not violate public policy against sexual harassment by ordering a city employee 
accused of sexual harassment be reinstated on the ground that the city did not implement disciplinary 
action on the sexual harassment claims within the six-month period imposed by the collective bargain-
ing agreement); Alexander v. Blue Cross of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 1082, 1089 (2001) (holding that 
arbitrators do not exceed their powers merely by rendering an erroneous decision on legal or factual 
issues, so long as the issue was within scope of the controversy submitted to the arbitrator).  
107 Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC, 768 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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serious error does not suffice to overturn [the arbitrator's] decision.’”108 
The First Circuit has repeatedly held that “an arbitral award may be chal-
lenged on a showing that the award was ‘mistakenly based on a crucial assump-
tion that is concededly a non-fact.’”109  The term “‘non-fact’ refers to a situation 
‘where the central fact underlying an arbitrator's decision is concededly errone-
ous.’”110  In other words, “there [must be] a ‘gross mistake . . . made out by [the] 
evidence,’ but for which, according to the arbitrator's rationale, a different result 
would have been reached.”111 
2. Grounds 
The FAA provides the following grounds for vacating an arbitration award:  
 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or un-
due means;  
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbi-
trators, or either of them;  
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing 
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in re-
fusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced;  
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award 
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.112 
 
The grounds stated in the FAA for vacating arbitration awards constitute the 
exclusive grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award.113  Parties cannot expand 
those grounds by contract.114 
                                                          
108 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) 
(citations omitted). 
109 N. Adams Reg’l Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 74 F.3d 346, 348 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Elecs. 
Corp. of Am. v. Int’l Union of Elec. Workers, Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974)).  
110 Id. 
111 Prudential–Bache Secs., Inc. v. Tanner et al., 72 F.3d 234, 237–38 (1st Cir. 1995); Elecs. Corp. 
of Am., at 1257 (citations omitted). 
112 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2013). 
113 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). 
114 Id. at 586–87. 
GRENIG FINAL FORMATTED 1/23/2015  11:18 AM 
2014] AFTER THE AWARD  83 
a. Corruption, Fraud, or Undue Means   
An arbitration award may be vacated “where the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means.”115  Irregularities depriving a party of a fair 
and impartial hearing, or amounting to an arbitrary disregard of the rights to 
which a party is entitled constitute such misconduct as will vitiate the award and 
cause it to be set aside.116  
The party seeking to vacate the award on the ground of fraud must establish 
fraud by clear and convincing evidence.117  “The appearance of impropriety, 
standing alone, is insufficient to establish [fraud or] bias.”118  A neutral arbitra-
tor's failure to disclose a relationship with a party may constitute fraud.119  While 
declarations from arbitrators may be received to support or rebut claims of dis-
qualification, an arbitrator's post-decision attempt to show no bias may have just 
the opposite effect.120 
 “Undue means” is defined as behavior that is “immoral, if not illegal . . . 
something wrong, according to the standards of morals which the law en-
forces.”121  It is “akin to fraud and corruption.”122  Undue means do not include 
a party's offering of evidence for the sole purpose of causing prejudice, at least 
                                                          
115 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).  
116 Gallus Invs., L.P. v. Pudgie's Famous Chicken, Ltd., 134 F.3d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1998); Am. 
Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1934).  See Reichman v. Creative Real Estate Con-
sultants, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1276, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that the “touchstone in considering 
claims of arbitrator misconduct is ‘fairness’”); Medina v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 870 P.2d 125, 
128 (N.M. 1994) (holding that perjury and concealment of material evidence justified setting aside the 
arbitration award).  See also Jennifer C. Bailey, Note, The Search to Clarify an Elusive Standard: What 
Relationships Between Arbitrator and Party Demonstrate Evident Partiality?, 2000 J. of DISP. RESOL. 
153, 155 (2000).  
117 See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988). 
118 Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
119 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 89 S. Ct. 337, 339 (1968). See also Mon-
tez v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a “federal court cannot 
vacate an arbitration award based on failure to disclose” or possible bias merely because arbitrator 
failed to comply with National Association of Securities Dealers rules; rather, the standard warranting 
vacatur of arbitration is evident partiality). 
120 See, e.g., Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Assocs., 217 Cal. App. 3d 518, 529 
(1990). 
121 See, e.g., MCI Constructors, LLC v. City Of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted) (holding that “typically, to prove that an [arbitration] award was procured by undue 
means, the party seeking vacatur ‘must show that the fraud or corruption was (1) not discoverable upon 
exercise of due diligence prior to arbitration, (2) materially related to [an] issue in [the] arbitration, and 
(3) established by clear and convincing evidence’”); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 
F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that to vacate award on grounds of “undue means” it must be 
shown that the “undue means” was not discoverable before the award was made and that it caused the 
award to be given).  
122 See Seither & Cherry Co. v. Ill. Bank Bldg. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 940, 945 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
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where “the arbitrators decline[ ] to receive it and state[ ] that they had not been 
prejudiced and [acted] only on the evidence before them.”123 
Ex parte consultations between an arbitrator and a party on material matters 
at issue in the arbitration proceeding may result in the award being set aside.124  
Alleged improper conduct by counsel, however, may not provide a basis for 
vacating an arbitration award where the alleged impropriety has no impact on 
the award.125 
b. Evident Partiality or Corruption   
The FAA provides that an arbitration award may be vacated “where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.”126  An 
arbitrator is under a continuing duty to disclose any interest or bias at any stage 
of the arbitration proceeding.  
Where a party seeks to upset an arbitration award on the ground that the 
                                                          
123 See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978). 
124 See Spitzer Elec. Co. v. Fred Girardi Constr. Corp., 147 N.Y.S.2d 40, 42–43 (1955). 
125 See Bell v. Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Mich. App. 2000) (noting that the party’s counsel 
had served as mediator in earlier proceedings involving dispute). 
126 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2013); Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 70, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the arbitration award in a dispute between 
insurers need not be vacated even though two of the arbitrators failed to disclose they were simultane-
ously serving on another panel in a proceeding that had a common witness, similar legal issues, and a 
related party); STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 
2011) (holding that the absence of disclosure regarding arbitrator's prior testimony as expert witness on 
legal issues that might arise in arbitration cannot form grounds for vacating an arbitral award); Johnson 
v. Gruma Corp., 614 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the supplemental disclosure provi-
sions of the California Arbitration Act did not require arbitrator to disclose his wife had been partner at 
law firm, when five years into arbitration, another partner at law firm became counsel for one of parties; 
arbitrator’s wife's employment at law firm ended more than two years before partner became involved 
in arbitration; and there was no evidence that connections between arbitrator's wife and partner were 
more significant or substantial than one case in which they were both listed as attorneys, or that her 
connection with partner colored the arbitrator's judgment); Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., Ltd., 512 F.3d 
294, 306 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that to succeed in having an arbitration award vacated on evident 
partiality theory, the challenging party must show that a reasonable person would have concluded that 
the arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration); Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. 
Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 530 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (holding that to establish partiality of 
an arbitrator, the party seeking to vacate award must “‘demonstrate [that a] reasonable person would 
have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to other party to the arbitration’”); Borst v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶¶ 26, 44, 717 N.W.2d 42, 54 (holding that an arbitrator on an uninsured motorist 
insurance panel who had an ongoing attorney-client relationship with the insured that selected him for 
panel was evidently partial and the arbitration award had to be vacated); Rebmann v. Rohde, 196 Cal. 
App. 4th 1283, 1294 (2011) (holding that a Jewish arbitrator did not have duty to disclose his family 
background and associations prior to the arbitration).  But see Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd's, London, 607 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the arbitrator's failure to disclose his 
and another arbitrator's roles in an ethics controversy did not require vacatur of the award on the ground 
of evident partiality or corruption).  
GRENIG FINAL FORMATTED 1/23/2015  11:18 AM 
2014] AFTER THE AWARD  85 
award is tainted by partiality, it is necessary to show a direct, definite, and de-
monstrable interest on the part of the arbitrator in the outcome of the arbitra-
tion.127  The failure to disclose a substantial interest creates an impression of 
bias, which, if proved, may be sufficient to vacate an award.128 
                                                          
127  See Thomas Kinkade Co. v. White, 711 F.3d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the artist 
established the purported neutral arbitrator's evident partiality as required to vacate arbitration award 
in favor of art dealer in dispute arising from contracts in which dealer agreed to be “signature dealer” 
of artist.  Nearly five years into arbitration, and in space of eight weeks, the arbitrator's law firm was 
hired by an art dealer's arbitrator-advocate and an art dealer for substantial engagements.  The arbitrator 
gave the art dealer a second and third chance to bolster proofs for his claims; allowed art dealer to rely 
upon 8,800 documents he deliberately and wrongfully withheld from artist for more than four years; 
denied the artist any relief on straightforward breach of contract claim that was virtually uncontested 
during hearings; failed to offer any response to serious objections raised by the artist; and awarded art 
dealer nearly $500,000 in attorney’s fees after plain terms of interim award indicated that request for 
fees had been denied.); Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 
282 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an arbitration award may not be vacated on the evident partiality 
theory, based on arbitrator's failure to disclose a trivial or insubstantial prior relationship between arbi-
trator and parties to proceeding); Three S Del., Inc., 492 F.3d at 530 (citations omitted) (holding that 
“to determine if party has established partiality [of an arbitrator in support of motion to vacate award], 
a court should assess four factors: ‘(1) the extent and the character of personal interest, pecuniary or 
otherwise, of the arbitrator in the proceedings; (2) the directness of the relationship between the arbi-
trator and the party [the arbitrator] is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to arbitra-
tor; and (4) the proximity in time between relationship and arbitration proceeding’”); Applied Indus. 
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that evident partiality was found when the arbitrator knew of a potential conflict, but failed to either 
investigate or disclose the intention not to investigate); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 
F.3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (holding that the “‘alleged partiality must be direct, 
definite, and capable of demonstration’” to vacate arbitration award, and “‘the party asserting it . . . 
must establish specific facts indicat[ing] improper motives on the part of the arbitrator’”); Delta Mine 
Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a party seeking 
vacation of arbitration award based on FAA's “undue means” or “misbehavior” provisions must demon-
strate that the conduct in question influenced the outcome of arbitration); Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart 
Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1980); Transit Cas. Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., LTD., 659 F. 
Supp. 1346, 1352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that an arbitration award will not be vacated on grounds 
of arbitral bias based on arbitrator's nondisclosure of insignificant relationships between arbitrators and 
parties); Guseinov v. Burns, 145 Cal. App. 4th 944, 957 (2006) (citations omitted) (holding that in 
determining whether an arbitration award is tainted by bias because an arbitrator failed to disclose a 
particular relationship, the test is objective—“whether the relationship would create an impression of 
bias in the mind of a reasonable person”); William B. Lucke, Inc. v. G.B. Spiegel, 266 N.E.2d 504, 508 
(Ill. App. 1970).  See generally STMicroelectronics, N.V., 648 F.3d at 77 (finding that the absence of 
disclosure regarding an arbitrator's prior testimony as an expert witness on legal issues that might arise 
in arbitration cannot form a ground for vacating an arbitral award); Leonard E. Gross & Howard L. 
Wieder, Should Parties' Disclosure Requirements for Arbitrators Be Honored by Courts: Positive Soft-
ware Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corporation, 33 S. ILL. U. L. J. 71, 83–84 (2008); Linden 
Fry, Note, Letting the Fox Guard the Henhouse: Why the Fifth Circuit's Ruling in Positive Software 
Solutions Sacrifices Procedural Fairness for Speed and Convenience, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 599, 615 
(2009); Perry A. Zirkel & Peter B. Winebrake, Legal Boundaries for Partiality and Misconduct of 
Labor Arbitrators, 1992 DET. C. L. REV. 679, 684 (1992).  
128 See Commw. Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 89 S. Ct. 337, 338 (1968). See also New Re-
gency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that an 
arbitrator's failure to disclose a nontrivial conflict of interest was evident partiality); ANR Coal Co., 
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In Nagel v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., the plaintiffs claimed they could 
not receive an unbiased arbitration from the National Grain & Feed Association 
because approximately half of the members were involved in the farm contract 
program in dispute. 129  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois disagreed, stating that the correct question is “whether the arbitrators dis-
played evident partiality.”130  The court held that simply because some of the 
arbitrators were grain merchants did not equate to partiality.131  The court con-
cluded that involvement with the contract program equated to expertise—a sub-
stantial reason why sophisticated commercial parties chose arbitration over lit-
igation.132 
In Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Services, Inc.,133 
the Eleventh Circuit said that evident partiality under the FAA exists only when 
“(1) an actual conflict exists, or (2) the arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose, 
information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential 
conflict exists.”134  The Eleventh Circuit said that an arbitration award may be 
vacated for evident partiality only when either “(1) an actual conflict exists, or 
(2) the arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose, information which would lead 
a reasonable person to believe that potential conflict exists.”135  According to 
                                                          
Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that an arbitrator's failure to 
reveal trivial facts that might call into question the ability to be impartial during proceedings did not 
require vacature of award); Hayden v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 4th 360, 365–66 (2007) 
(holding that for the purpose of the California statutory disclosure requirements for a neutral arbitrator 
concerning past or prospective service with party to arbitration, “party” includes a legal affiliate of a 
named party only if the affiliate is involved in transaction, contract, or facts that gave rise to issues 
subject to proceeding); Parks v. Sombke, 732 A.2d 907, 911 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (citations omit-
ted) (holding that the standard for “whether disclosure [of partiality] is required is whether facts ‘might 
reasonably lead to an impression or appearance of bias’”); Thomas James Assoc., Inc. v. Owens, 1 
S.W.3d 315, 320–21 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that an arbitrator's failure to disclose involvement in a 
prior unrelated arbitration did not create a reasonable impression of evident partiality in mind of an 
objective observer or constitute “other misconduct”); Johnston v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 6 Cal. App. 
3d 839, 842 (1970) (citations omitted) (holding that an arbitrator should have disclosed he was ac-
quainted with the claimant's counsel and had previously referred cases to the claimant's arbitrator).  But 
see Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union# 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742, 
745–46 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that proof of specific facts indicating improper motives was required); 
Borst, 717 N.W.2d at 50 (holding that evident partiality due to a relationship between an arbitrator and 
a party cannot be avoided simply by full disclosure at the outset and a declaration of impartiality). 
129 65 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745–46 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
130 Id. at 746.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998).  
134 Id. See also Univ. Commons–Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339 
(11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 896–97 (2d Cir. 
1997); Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994). 
135 Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust, 146 F.3d at 1312. 
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the Ninth Circuit, in cases involving an arbitrator's nondisclosure of facts creat-
ing a reasonable impression of partiality, a showing of actual bias by the arbi-
trator is not required for vacatur of the arbitration award.136 
Although the FAA provides that a court can vacate an award “[w]here there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,” it does not provide for 
pre-award removal of an arbitrator.137  A party may challenge any award ulti-
mately rendered on the grounds of evident partiality.138  However, a party to 
arbitration who knows of an arbitrator's alleged bias before rendition of the 
award and does not complain until after rendition of the award waives the im-
propriety.139 
In some circumstances, an award of damages may be so grossly excessive 
or inadequate as to indicate partiality.140  A court will not “set aside an award 
for mere inadequacy in [the] amount [of damages], unless it is so great as to 
indicate corruption or partisan bias on the part of the arbitrators.”141 
In National Football League Players Ass’n v. National Football League, a 
dispute over discipline imposed on players who tested positive for banned sub-
stances was heard by the National Football League’s (NFL) Chief Legal Of-
ficer.142  The court rejected the Players Association’s claim that the decision—
treated as an arbitration award—should be vacated because the arbitrator was 
                                                          
136 See Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1312–13 (9th Cir. 2004). 
137 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2013). 
138 See Aviall, Inc., 110 F.3d at 897. 
139 See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB, 386 F.3d at 1313 (holding that the process by which the parties 
each selected the arbitrator, the party-selected arbitrators selected the third arbitration, and the party-
selected arbitrators did not promise to be neutral until the hearing, the process should have put losing 
party on notice that arbitrator chosen by prevailing party could have had some connection with prevail-
ing party.  By waiting until award issued, the losing party waived its right to raise a claim of evident 
partiality.); JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 
2003) (holding that the party was put on notice of the risk when it signed the contract and chose not to 
inquire about the backgrounds of committee members before or during hearing waived right to chal-
lenge the decision based on evident partiality); Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 
F.3d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the party waived the issue of evident partiality by failing to 
raise it before arbitration panel); Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., Inc., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that although party “did not have full knowledge of [all] relationships to which they [objected] 
they did have concerns about [the arbitrator's] impartiality and yet chose to have her remain on the 
panel rather than spend[ing] time and money [to investigate] further until losing the arbitration”); Gar-
field & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  But see Apperson v. Fleet Carrier 
Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a successful party “may not rely on the failure 
to object for bias [unless] ‘all the facts now argued as to the alleged bias were known, . . . at the time 
the joint committee heard their [first] grievances’”); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 
1203 (11th Cir. 1982); HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
140 Mork v. Eureka–Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 42 N.W.2d 33, 34, 39 (Minn. 1950). 
141 Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 1935). 
142 See generally 654 F. Supp. 2d 960, 969 (D. Minn. 2009). 
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partial.143  
The court pointed out that the Players Association had agreed with the NFL 
in their collective bargaining agreement that the Commissioner or the Commis-
sioner’s designee could hear disciplinary appeals.144  The arbitrator in question 
was the NFL’s Chief Legal Officer.  Although the arbitrator had given the NFL 
legal advice regarding the matter that he heard, the court concluded that because 
the Players Association had not objected to the arbitrator before the award it had 
waived any claim of bias.145 
Poston v. National Football League Players Ass’n involved the Players As-
sociation and a licensed “contract advisor.”146  A licensed contract advisor “rep-
resent[ed] NFL players in various types of negotiations, including negotiations 
for employment contracts with particular teams and associated marketing op-
portunities.”147  Pursuant to their agreements with the Players Association, “the 
conduct of such advisors was governed by the regulations established” by the 
Players Association.148  The Players Association, “through its Disciplinary 
Committee, ha[d] the power to discipline contract advisors for noncompliance 
with [these] regulations.”149  
One of the advisor’s employees improperly purchased airline tickets for 
four college players in order to attend a party at the advisor’s company.150  One 
player was suspended one game for impermissible benefits.151  The Players As-
sociation disciplined the contract advisor.152  
In accordance with established procedures, the Players Association’s Disci-
plinary Committee's determination was appealed to arbitration.153  The Players 
Association selected an arbitrator to resolve the matter.154  The parties stipulated 
that the following two issues would be presented to the arbitrator: (1) whether 
the contract advisors engaged in or were engaging in prohibited conduct, as al-
                                                          
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 968–69. 
145 The court found that the Players Association, knowing the arbitrator had given legal advice to 
the NFL about the matter, requested that he serve as arbitrator specifically because of his involvement.  
Id.  




150 Id.  
151 Id.   
152 Id.   
153 Id.  
154 Id.   
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leged; and (2) if so, whether the discipline imposed should be affirmed or mod-
ified.155  The arbitrator upheld the discipline.156 
The contract advisor filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award.157  The 
court rejected the advisor’s claim that the arbitrator was not impartial.158  The 
court noted that the contract advisor knew, or should have known, that the arbi-
trator used in the case was the one regularly used by the Players Association, 
and, therefore, should have raised any concerns regarding the arbitrator's poten-
tial partiality before the arbitration proceeding.159  The court explained that “ar-
bitration awards should not be vacated ‘where the arbitrator has disclosed any 
circumstance that would show bias,’ or where ‘an objecting party who is in fact 
aware of the relationship at the time of the arbitration remains silent.’”160 
c. Refusing to Postpone Hearing or to Hear Pertinent and Material Evidence   
An award may be vacated where the rights of the parties were substantially 
prejudiced by the arbitrator's refusal to postpone the hearing upon sufficient 
cause being shown for the postponement.161  Courts will examine the circum-
stances of each case to determine whether the denial of the request for postpone-
ment was arbitrary or unreasonable.162 
A court may vacate an award because of the refusal of the arbitrator to hear 
                                                          
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Id.   
158 Id. 
159 Id. at *4. 
160 Id.  
161 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2013). See Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 
1997) (vacating an award where the arbitrator refused to continue the hearing to permit testimony by 
company official); Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 932 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Alaska 1997) (ex-
plaining that the court would review arbitrator's decision not to allow for postponement of hearing 
because of withdrawal of party's counsel twenty-five days prior to arbitration with deference, reversing 
only for gross error).  But see Ottawa Office Integration Inc. v. FTF Bus. Sys., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 
215, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (deciding that the arbitrator had a reasonable basis to deny request for addi-
tional adjournment of hearing in breach of contract case due to the illness of the defendants' primary 
witness because the defendants failed to substantiate the witness' alleged medical condition); Fairchild 
& Co., Inc. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D.D.C. 1981).  
162 See SWAB Fin., LLC v. E*Trade Secs., LLC, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1181, 1198–99 (2007) (holding 
that the arbitrators did not abuse their discretion in refusing to grant the plaintiff's request to continue 
hearing claims against a securities broker where the request for a continuance came more than three 
years after the customer first initiated the arbitration; more than one year beyond the original arbitration 
date after the customer had already once refused to appear at the arbitration hearing; and after the cus-
tomer had twice brought legal actions against the broker, and twice been ordered to arbitrate the dis-
pute); Johnson Rock Prods., Inc. v. Hanover Bay, Inc., 620 P.2d 982, 983 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
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evidence material to the controversy.163  Not every failure of the arbitrator to 
receive relevant evidence constitutes misconduct requiring vacatur of the arbi-
trator's award.164  
“Vacatur is appropriate only when the exclusion of relevant evidence ‘so 
affects the rights of a party that it may be said that [the party] was deprived of a 
fair hearing.’”165  The refusal to receive offered evidence is not sufficient to 
warrant the vacating of an award unless the evidence is shown to have been 
“clearly relevant to the disputed issue.”166 
d.  Exceeding Powers 
Arbitrators derive their authority solely from the arbitration agreement or 
the submission to arbitration.  Since arbitrators derive their power from the ar-
bitration agreement, they have no power to decide issues not submitted for res-
olution.  An arbitrator exceeds his or her powers by making an award that fails 
to comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement.167  The parties' arbitration 
                                                          
163 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). See U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat. Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1176 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the arbitration panel did not refuse to hear pertinent and material evidence in 
reinsurance contract dispute as would allow for vacatur of arbitration award under the FAA by holding 
an ex parte meeting with the panel-retained workers' compensation experts; the panel only held the 
meeting after listening to and considering parties' evidence; the panel advised the parties that it was 
unable to reach a decision and that it would retain the experts; the parties discussed what review process 
to use; and the panel allowed parties to review experts' written conclusions, submit briefing, and ques-
tion the experts about their qualifications and conclusions). 
164 See Rosensweig v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 494 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted) (holding that “in making evidentiary determinations, arbitrators are not required to ‘follow all 
the niceties observed by the federal courts, but they must give the parties a fundamentally fair hear-
ing’”); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(citations omitted) (holding that “it is well within arbitrator's authority to refuse to hear evidence that 
is cumulative”); Checkrite of San Jose, Inc. v. Checkrite, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D. Colo. 1986).  
165 Hoteles Condado Beach, LA Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 
763 F.2d 34, 37–38, 40 (1st Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Burlage v. Superior Court of Ven-
tura Cnty., 178 Cal. App. 4th 524, 534–35 (2009) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion 
in finding that real property seller's rights were substantially prejudiced by the arbitrator's refusal to 
hear evidence material to a controversy over the encroachment of the property's pool and fence into a 
neighboring property, thus, supporting vacation of the arbitration award where the arbitrator excluded 
evidence that after the purchase the title company paid $10,950 for a lot-line adjustment that gave pur-
chasers title to the encroaching land; the seller was not permitted to refute purchasers' expert who 
opined that the encroachment reduced the value of the property by $100,000; the purchasers presented 
expert testimony about the effect of what had become a nonexistent encroachment; and the arbitrator 
ultimately awarded $552,750 in compensatory damages). 
166 John Post Constr. Corp. v. Good Humor Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 392, 392–93 (N.Y. 1957). 
167 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). See e.g., Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012) (holding that the arbitrator did not exceed her jurisdiction by ruling 
the employment arbitration agreement allowed class arbitration of sex discrimination claims against 
employer); Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 846 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that issu-
ing an award consisting solely of panels holding satisfied the arbitration agreement's requirement that 
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agreement sets the conditions, limitations, and restrictions to be observed by the 
arbitrators in making the award.  It is presumed that the arbitrators do not exceed 
their authority.168 
                                                          
the panel render a reasoned award); Boeing Co. v. Int’l Union of United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), 600 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the “arbitrators 
are authorized to order legally enforceable remedies for the violation of contracts that they’re called on 
to enforce”); Totes Isotoner Corp. v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union Council/UFCW Local 664C, 532 F.3d 
405, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “when arbitrator reaches question not committed to him by the 
parties, he acts outside of his authority such that an order vacating an award is appropriate”); Comedy 
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the arbitrator acted 
beyond scope of his authority as matter of California law in resolving dispute over trademark licensing 
agreement by attempting to bind all of licensee's affiliates, including relatives who were not parties to 
licensing agreement, as relatives who were not parties to licensing agreement could not be bound by its 
provisions); Truck Drivers Local No. 164 v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 512 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that an arbitrator in labor dispute “does not exceed his authority every time he makes an inter-
pretive error”); Prostyakov v. Masco Corp., 513 F.3d 716, 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an 
arbitrator did not exceed his powers, even if he erred in applying Indiana's conflict-of-law principles); 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 580, 584 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that “[a]rbitration is creature of contract, and an arbitration panel has authority to decide only 
issues that have been submitted for arbitration by the parties”); Poland Spring Corp. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 1145, 314 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding 
that an arbitrator exceeded the scope of his jurisdiction by reinstating an employee fired for insubordi-
nation and awarding back pay, after finding that employee had been insubordinate, but finding that 
mitigating circumstances called for lesser punishment where collective bargaining agreement provided 
that insubordination “shall” constitute just cause for immediate termination regardless of mitigating 
circumstances); Brook v. Peak Int'l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (holding 
that because “arbitration is a matter of contract, . . . . ‘the power and authority of arbitrators in an 
arbitration proceeding is dependent on the provisions under which the arbitrators were appointed’”); 
Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 744, 280 F.3d 1133, 1138–39, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that an arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by relying on past practices of the parties 
where the contract included a zipper clause providing that the agreement superseded all prior agree-
ments); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
arbitrator exceeded scope of his authority in making an award in favor of party for breach of contract 
based on determination that shipper's procedures were “unfair.”  The intrinsic fairness of shipper's pro-
cedures was not before arbitrator, who was empowered to decide only whether termination was within 
terms of parties' agreement.); Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 115 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding 
that an arbitrator exceeded his authority in deciding issues beyond the submitted issue of increase in 
toll schedule); W. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that the award did not contain findings or conclusions required by agreement); Cnty. of Hennepin v. 
Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., Local # 19, 527 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Minn. 1995) (holding that an 
arbitrator did not have authority to decide constitutional issues in public sector labor dispute); Atlantic 
Painting & Contracting Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Ky. 1984) (holding that an 
arbitrator exceeded his authority by making an award beyond the submission of the parties). See also 
City of Richmond v. Serv. Emps, Int’l Union, Local 1021, 189 Cal. App. 4th 663, 671, 673 (2010) 
(holding that an arbitrator exceeds his powers if the arbitrator strays beyond the scope of the parties' 
agreement by resolving issues the parties did not agree to arbitrate, orders an unauthorized remedy, or 
resolves nonarbitral issues). 
168 See Greene v. Mari & Sons Flooring Co., Inc., 289 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Mass. 1972); Alexander v. 
Blue Cross of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 1082, 1087, 1092 (2001) (holding that the arbitrator did not exceed 
his powers by refusing to impose a discovery sanction against insurer so as to warrant vacating arbitra-
tion award in favor of insured's even if sanction was mandatory under California discovery statutes). 
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Arbitrators must clearly exceed their powers before an award will be over-
turned.  “A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award which per-
mits an inference that the arbitrators may have exceeded their authority is no 
reason for refusing to enforce the award.”169  Where an arbitrator's opinion in-
sufficiently explains the arbitrator's decision, the proper remedy is to remand 
the matter to the same arbitrator for clarification.170  “Where the arbitrators have 
exceeded their authority in one respect such as allowance of fees, their decision 
is unenforceable only to the extent that such authority was exceeded.”171 
Where an arbitration award is attacked on the ground that the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers through the erroneous interpretation of the contract, the 
reviewing court should determine whether the construction of the contract made 
by the arbitrators was a reasonably possible one that could seriously be made in 
the context in which the contract was made.172 
Although an “arbitrators’ view of the law might be open to serious question, 
an award [that] is within the terms of the submission, will not be set aside by a 
court for error either in law or fact, . . . if the award contains the honest decision 
of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing.’”173  Some courts have vacated 
                                                          
169 See Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797, 802–04 (5th Cir. 
2013) (holding that because an arbitration award granting video game publisher perpetual license in 
video game's intellectual property drew its essence from contract between video game developer and 
publisher; the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in awarding perpetual license, so as to permit district 
court to vacate arbitration award; the developer had committed extraordinary breach of the contract; an 
equally extraordinary realignment of the parties' original rights was necessary to preserve essence of 
contract; and the perpetual license furthered contract's general aims and represented attempt by arbitra-
tor to restore to developer and publisher the contract's fundamental goal of mutual access to financial 
benefits derived from their joint creation and distribution of game); Hilltop Constr., Inc. v. Lou Park 
Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1982).  
170 See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
given the evident incoherence of explanation volunteered by securities industry arbitration panel, the 
district court acted reasonably in remanding award for clarification of bases of award in order to enable 
court to conducted limited judicial review); Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 970, 977 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
171 Saville Int'l, Inc. v. Galanti Grp., Inc., 438 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. App. 1982) (citations omitted).  
Cf. Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 473–74 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
the arbitrator’s reasoned award was valid under the FAA: “[i]n eight pages, the arbitrator laid out the 
facts, described the contentions of the parties, and decided which of the two proposals [for price for-
mula] should prevail,” and parties “did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law”); Cat Char-
ter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 846 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that issuing an award consist-
ing solely of the panel’s holding satisfied the arbitration agreement's requirement that the panel render 
a reasoned award). 
172 Susquehanna Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. at Conklen v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 338 
N.E.2d 132, 133 (N.Y. 1975) (arbitration decision review). 
173 Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations 
omitted). 
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awards that were found to be “arbitrary and capricious” or “completely irra-
tional.”174  These grounds have been criticized as giving a reviewing court a 
broad license—much more expansive than that afforded under the “manifest 
disregard” of the law standard or the “public policy” doctrine—to intrude into 
the merits of the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute.175 
“The ‘completely irrational’ award ground for vacatur was first mentioned 
in . . . Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc.”176  The Third Circuit held 
that “an award of an arbitrator is not subject to judicial revision unless it is 
‘completely irrational.’”177  The court concluded that “an award may not stand 
if it does not meet the test of fundamental rationality.”178  In Ainsworth v. Skur-
nick, the Eleventh Circuit held that “an [arbitration] award is arbitrary and ca-
pricious only if ‘a ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred from 
the facts of the case.’”179  “‘The onus is on the party requesting vacatur to refute 
every . . . rational basis upon which the arbitrator could have relied.’”180  
3. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
The doctrine of manifest disregard of the law as an independent basis for 
reviewing American arbitration awards lies in dicta from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wilko v. Swan.181  In Wilko v. Swan, the Court, in dicta, considered 
whether a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions 
of the Securities Act might be subject to judicial review.182  The Court concluded 
that an arbitrator’s decision would have to have been in “manifest disregard” of 
                                                          
174 See Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non–Statutory Grounds for Judicial 
Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 23 (Oct. 1996) (critical examination 
of these bases for vacating commercial arbitration awards) [hereinafter Vacatur]. 
175 Id. 
176 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972). See Vacatur, supra note 175, at 22, 28 (critical examination 
of the “completely irrational” standard). 
177 Vacatur, supra note 174, at 78. Accord French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
784 F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1986). 
178 Vacatur, supra note 174, at 78. 
179 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
180 Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 
See El Mundo Broad. Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, CLC, 116 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 
1997) (holding that an arbitrator who treated the appointment of employee to new position as a contin-
uing violation and heard an untimely grievance exceeded the scope of his authority); Bonshire v. 
Thompson, 52 Cal. App. 4th 803, 806 (1997) (holding that an arbitrator exceeded his powers by relying 
on extrinsic evidence to reform the parties' contract contrary to integration clause that expressly pro-
hibited consideration of such evidence). 
181 346 U.S. 427, 436 (2d Cir. 1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
182 Id.  
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the law to be vacated.183 
Manifest disregard of the law is different than an error in interpreting the 
law.184  Manifest disregard of the law warranting the setting aside of an arbitra-
tion award must go beyond a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the 
arbitrators to understand or apply the law; it must so affect the rights of a party 
that it may be said to deprive the party of a fair hearing.185  The manifest disre-
gard of the law must involve a “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” 
law.186 
The federal courts have applied “slightly different definitions for manifest 
disregard” of the law.187  The Second Circuit has held that manifest disregard 
should be upheld “only when the arbitrator knew of the applicable law, under-
stood the law to apply to the facts, and refused to apply the law.”188  The Ninth 
                                                          
183 Id.  
184 See Long John Silver's Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations 
omitted) (holding that “an arbitrator does not act in manifest disregard of law unless ‘(1) applicable 
legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate, and (2) the arbitrator refused to 
heed that legal principle’”); Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted) (holding that to show “manifest disregard of law, the moving party must show that the arbi-
trator ‘understood and correctly stated law, but proceeded to disregard’” it); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (holding that “in 
addition to the grounds under Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) on which arbitration award may be 
vacated, an award may be vacated only if it is in ‘manifest disregard of the law’ or is contrary to an 
‘explicit public policy’”); Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted) (holding that “manifest disregard of the law” “‘means more than error or misunder-
standing with respect to the law’”; rather, “arbitrators must have appreciated existence of a clearly 
governing principle [of law] but decided to ignore . . . it”).  But see STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit 
Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (holding that a court will 
not vacate arbitral award on ground of “manifest disregard of the law” “because of ‘a simple error in 
law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply [law,]’ but only when a party clearly demon-
strates ‘that the [arbitral] panel intentionally defied the law’”). 
185 See STMicroelectronics, N.V., 648 F.3d at 78 (holding that a court will not vacate arbitral award 
on ground of manifest disregard of the law because of simple error in law or failure by arbitrators to 
understand or apply law); Countrywide Fin. Corp. v. Bundy, 187 Cal. App. 4th 234, 260-61 (2010) 
(holding that an arbitrator did not manifest disregard of the law so as to warrant vacatur by ruling that 
the classes' claims were not barred by the preclusive effects of previous actions where employees were 
expressly excluded from settlement in first prior action and the classes in second prior action did not 
involve same claims or time frames); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Muni. 
Emps., AFL-CIO v. Milwaukee Cnty., 795 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that, unlike 
reviewing decision by lower court, a court may not overturn arbitration award because the arbitrator 
made error of law, unless the award shows a manifest disregard of law.  “[M]anifest disregard of the 
law” does not mean wrong, but instead, means the arbitrator or arbitration panel understood and cor-
rectly stated law, but ignored it). 
186 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1986). 
187 Weathers P. Bolt, Comment, Much Ado About Nothing: The Effect of Manifest Disregard on 
Arbitration Agreement Decisions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 161, 167 (2011). 
188 T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 340 (2d Cir. 2010) (suggesting 
that manifest disregard should be thought of as judicially created gloss on 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) and 
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Circuit has defined manifest disregard as “shorthand for a statutory ground un-
der the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).”189 
The Seventh Circuit interprets manifest disregard to apply to situations 
where the arbitrator orders the parties to disobey the law, or the arbitrator's “or-
der does not adhere to the legal principles specified by the contract.”190  Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, it has defined manifest disregard narrowly so it fits 
comfortably under section 10(a)(4).191 
In Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel Inc.,192 the Supreme Court rejected 
the argument that the existence of the manifest disregard review standard cre-
ated in Wilko v. Swan193 supported expansion of judicial review by the parties 
to an arbitration agreement.  The Court said that manifest disregard was differ-
ent because the Court created it, while the parties in Hall Street attempted to 
create a nonstatutory standard of review.194 
The First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have construed Hall 
Street as holding that the common law standards are no longer valid grounds for 
vacatur because the FAA’s grounds are exclusive.195  
The Sixth Circuit has held that manifest regard survives as an independent 
ground for vacatur.196  According to the Sixth Circuit, Hall Street merely pro-
hibits private parties from contracting for greater judicial review.197  
The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that, after Hall Street, manifest 
disregard exists as a shorthand or judicial gloss for section 10(a)(4) of the 
                                                          
allowing vacatur when arbitrators exceed their powers). Accord Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 
665 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
189 Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).  See generally 
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., No. 07-1830, 2008 WL 3838010 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th 
Cir. Nov. 14, 2008) (unpublished opinion). 
190 Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted) (holding that “‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may reject an 
arbitrator's award under the Federal Arbitration Act,” unless the award directs the parties to violate the 
legal rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration); Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction 
Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 
191 Affymax, Inc., 660 F.3d at 285; Halim, 516 F.3d at 563 (citations omitted).  
192 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008). 
193 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). 
194 Id. 
195 See, e.g., Affymax, Inc., 660 F.3d at 284 (citations omitted) (stating that manifest disregard ap-
plies when an award “directs the parties to violate the legal rights of third persons who did not consent 
to the arbitration”); Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2010); Ramos-
Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (dicta); Citigroup Global Mkts., 
Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). 
196 See generally Coffee Beanery, Ltd., No. 07-1830, 2008 WL 3838010. 
197 See generally id. 
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FAA.198  
In Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, the Fourth Circuit held “that mani-
fest disregard continues to exist either ‘as an independent ground for review or 
as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 
10.’”199 
4. Public Policy 
An award may be held to be in excess of the arbitrator's power if it violates 
a well-defined and dominant public policy as “‘ascertained by reference to the 
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed pub-
lic interests.’”200  The public policy exception was first recognized in labor ar-
bitration cases, and is rooted in the common law doctrine of a court's power to 
refuse to enforce a contract that violates public policy or law.201 
In considering an employer's claim that considerations of public policy ren-
der an arbitration award in a labor arbitration unenforceable, the Supreme Court 
has held that a court is required to assume that the collective bargaining agree-
ment itself called for the employee's reinstatement, as found by the arbitrator, 
and the court would treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement 
between the employer and the union as to the proper meaning of the contract's 
words “just cause.”202  The Court explained that both the employer and the union 
had granted the arbitrator the authority to interpret the meaning of their con-
tract's language, and the employer did not claim that the arbitrator had acted 
outside his contractually delegated authority.203 
According to the Supreme Court, the relevant question in considering 
whether an employer's claim that considerations of public policy render an ar-
bitration award that reinstated an alleged drug user was unenforceable was not 
whether the employee's drug use itself violated public policy, but whether the 
                                                          
198 Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009); Stolt-Nielsen, SA 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 662 
(2010). 
199 Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 673 F.3d 472, 483 n.7 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).  
200 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 30 (1987) (citations 
omitted). See also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations 
omitted) (holding that “‘to vacate [a labor] arbitration award on public policy grounds, [the court] must 
find (1) that ‘an explicit, well defined and dominant policy’ exists . . . and (2) ‘that the policy is one 
that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator’”). 
201 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. at 30; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
Union No. 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). 
202 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000). 
203 Id. 
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decision to reinstate him did so.204  Thus, a court must inquire into whether the 
contractual agreement to reinstate an employee, with specified conditions, ran 
“contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy, as ascer-
tained by reference to positive law and not from general considerations of sup-
posed public interests.”205  
The Supreme Court stated that a court's “authority to invoke the public pol-
icy exception to enforcement of labor arbitration awards is not limited solely to 
instances where the arbitration award itself violates positive law;” but, “[n]ev-
ertheless, the public policy exception is narrow and must satisfy the principles 
set forth in governing Supreme Court precedent.”206  When applying the public 
policy exception to the enforcement of a labor arbitration award, the court cau-
tioned that the “courts should approach with particular caution to divine further 
public policy in that area.”207 
Relying on labor arbitration cases, several courts have vacated commercial 
arbitration awards on the ground that they violated public policy.  The Tenth 
and Eighth Circuits have held that an award can be vacated when it, or the un-
derlying contract as interpreted in the arbitration award, explicitly conflicts 
with, violates, or is contrary to a public policy.208  In those circuits, the focus is 
upon the award itself and the court must examine the merits of the arbitration 
award in order to ascertain whether the arbitrator's analysis and application of 
the disputed contract or relevant law is incorrect and, therefore, violates or con-
flicts with the public policy.209 
The Eleventh, Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits apply a different standard 
in determining whether to vacate awards under the public policy doctrine.210  
Under the standard used by these circuits, a reviewing court does not evaluate 
the merits of the arbitration award.  Instead of evaluating the correctness of the 
arbitrator's interpretation of the disputed contract or relevant law, the court fo-
cuses its analysis on determining whether implementation of the award will 





208 PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); Seymour v. 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). 
209 See Vacatur, supra note 174, at 22, 27 (critically examining these bases for vacating commercial 
arbitration awards). 
210 See, e.g., Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 1995); Brown v. 
Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, 
Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas 
Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). 
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compel one of the parties to violate a well-defined and dominant public pol-
icy.211  If implementation of the award will place one or both of the parties to 
the award in violation of public policy, the award must be vacated.212 
5. Procedure 
A party seeking relief from an arbitration award bears a heavy burden; it is 
not enough to show that the arbitrator committed error, or even serious error.213  
Courts will vacate an award for misconduct only where the objecting party has 
demonstrated that the misconduct actually prejudiced the party's rights.214  
An award may be vacated because of fraud or misconduct on the part of a 
party when such conduct had a tendency to influence an arbitrator improperly.215  
There may be sufficient misconduct “to cause the court to set aside an award, 
even where there is no ground for importing the slightest improper motives to 
the [arbitrators].”216  For example, an arbitrator's visit by himself to the site of a 
construction job involved in a dispute was held to constitute misconduct war-
ranting setting aside the award.217 
In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, the Supreme Court held that under 
the FAA, a court may vacate an arbitrator’s decision only in very unusual cir-
cumstances.218  According to the Supreme Court, the sole question for a court 
                                                          
211 See Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 665 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) 
(holding that “to permit the court to refuse enforcement of an arbitrator's award [under the Federal 
Arbitration Act] on public policy grounds must be “‘well defined and dominant,’” and must be “‘ascer-
tained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed 
public interests’””). See also Vacatur, supra note 174, at 22–23 (critically examining these bases for 
vacating commercial arbitration awards). 
212 Vacatur, supra note 174, at 22–23 (critically examining these bases for vacating commercial 
arbitration awards). 
213 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013). 
214 See, e.g., Creative Homes & Millwork, Inc. v. Hinkle, 426 S.E.2d 480, 483 (N.C. App. 1993). 
215 See Smith v. Home Ins. Co., 183 S.E. 166, 169 (S.C. 1936) (citations omitted). See also Hough 
v. Osswald, 556 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. App. 1990) (holding that the allegation that a party committed 
fraud to procure award was not grounds for vacating award in absence of showing of misconduct on 
the part of the arbitrator). 
216 See, e.g., McIntosh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 78 P.2d 82, 83 (Mont. 1938) (citations omitted). 
217 See, e.g., Fred J. Brotherton, Inc. v. Kreielsheimer, 83 A.2d 707, 709 (N.J. 1951).  But see Pain-
eWebber Grp. Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P’ship, 187 F.3d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
prevailing party's errors in identifying privileged documents during arbitration were discovery mis-
takes, not intentional misconduct constituting “undue means”); Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 146 N.E. 
436, 438 (N.Y. App. 1925) (finding that the award should not be vacated where independent inspection 
was minimal and inconsequential). 
218 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013). 
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reviewing an arbitration award is whether the arbitrator, even arguably, inter-
preted the parties’ contract, not whether the arbitrator got it right or wrong.219  
“Because the parties ‘bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agree-
ment,’ an arbitral decision ‘even arguably construing or applying the contract’ 
must stand, regardless of court's view of its (de)merits.” 220 Only if the arbitrator 
acts outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority—issuing award 
that simply reflects his own notions of economic justice, rather than drawing its 
essence from the contract—may court overturn his determination. 
Notice of a motion to vacate an arbitration award must be served upon the 
adverse party within three months after the award is filed and delivered.221  “If 
an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award 
to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing 
by the arbitrator.”222 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although it is frequently said that an arbitration award is final and binding, 
the award may not signal the end of further proceedings.  The FAA provides 
procedures for confirming, correcting, and vacating arbitration awards. 
Review of an arbitration award is limited.  A court may vacate an arbitra-
tor’s decision only in very unusual circumstances.  For those arbitration pro-
ceedings governed by the FAA, the grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA cannot 
be modified by agreement of the parties.  Because the purpose of arbitration is 
the settlement of controversies and the avoidance of litigation, the limitations 
on review help to achieve that purpose and to bring closure. 
 
 
                                                          
219 Id. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 510 (2001) (holding that 
a serious error of fact was not enough to warrant overturning an arbitration award). 
220 Id. (citation omitted). 
221 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2013). 
222 9 U.S.C. § 10(b). 
